Hamide Aflatouni; Zahra Khazaei; Majid Mollayousefi
Abstract
Abstract
Moral Sensibility is a relatively new theory in moral philosophy rooted in the moral sentimentalism of the 18th century. This theory is based on the premise that, in addition ...
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Abstract
Moral Sensibility is a relatively new theory in moral philosophy rooted in the moral sentimentalism of the 18th century. This theory is based on the premise that, in addition to rational cognition, sensory and emotional perceptions are genuinely involved in the formation of moral foundations. Generally, contemporary theories on this subject can be divided into two main categories: anti-realistic and realistic. John McDowell, as a realistic philosopher, draws on John Locke's secondary qualities model to explain the reality of sensory and emotional perceptions. He presents an interpretation of secondary qualities, such as colors, as a framework for explaining moral values and the genuine understanding of the reality of values, as well as confirming the objectivity of moral claims. On the other hand, McDowell, as a proponent of virtue ethics, believes that moral sensibility is a virtue, and just as virtue encompasses general and particular virtues in different circumstances, we have a general moral sensibility that is a characteristic of virtuous individuals, as well as specific moral sensitivities in specific situations. While this new and intriguing theory has its merits, it also faces some criticisms. One of the fundamental challenges that this perspective confronts is its conflict with the central principle of realism, in that, as a realistic theory, it questions the independence of personal sensory and emotional perceptions. This article introduces this viewpoint and discusses the criticisms raised about it.
